


## Pacific Century Institutions: Conceiving Options for United States Policy

by

Colonel Timothy Andrew Chafos  
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United States Army War College  
Class of 2012

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**PACIFIC CENTURY INSTITUTIONS:  
CONCEIVING OPTIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The Pacific Rim has long been viewed as an area of increasing power relations. U.S.-Chinese relations are vital to security and prosperity in the region and in the world. The United States has declared a policy shift to focus on the Pacific. United States policy statements to date have not included a vision or proposals for improved international institutions for the Pacific region. U.S. policy seems focused on isolating China—potentially the pivotal country in the region and in 21<sup>st</sup>-century security. Policy statements, taken together with military strategies focusing on the Pacific and numerous complaints about trade policy and human rights, seem intended to send a message that the United States and China are opposing sides. The United States should consider options for an institutional framework for economic and security cooperation in the Pacific. At worst, substantive proposals would improve dialog and foster transparency. At best, the United States could lead an effort to institute an enduring and beneficial institutional framework as the centerpiece of security.





PACIFIC CENTURY INSTITUTIONS:  
CONCEIVING OPTIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY

Uncompromising thought is the luxury of the closeted recluse.<sup>1</sup>

–Dr. Thomas Woodrow Wilson  
45<sup>th</sup> Governor of New Jersey,  
28<sup>th</sup> President of the United States

In the fall of 2011, the long-anticipated Pacific Century seemed finally to be getting underway in earnest—and the beginnings were not auspicious. The President of the United States referred to an alliance with Australia and focused on military activities when announcing troop rotations to Australia and expressing concern over Chinese military buildup.<sup>2</sup> The United States Secretary of State repeatedly lectured China regarding its trade and labor policies. United States policy and the future of Pacific and Indian Ocean relations need not be so deterministic. Although official U.S. statements suggest partnership between the United States and China, the current approach seems aimed at conflict.

To many eyes, the United States and China appear on a collision course. From another point of view, the two countries have such significant common interests they are co-dependent. Most obvious is trade. Goods “Made in China” pervade United States markets, while tremendous sustained economic growth in China is dependent upon exports to the United States. Beyond bilateral trade, both countries trade extensively with growth-oriented economies. Instability in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions suits neither. To be sure, Chinese and American interests can and will come into conflict, but they need not be directly opposed on every issue. There is a strong basis for common

ground on economic and security issues, but this common ground must be cultivated in order to bear fruit. The most obvious obstacles to cooperation are values divergence and emerging great power rivalry. A less obvious obstacle is the lack of institutions, organizations, or forums through which to channel communications. The United States should include the potential for bi-lateral or multi-lateral institutions in the set of options it applies in the Pacific. The institutional framework for security in the Pacific and Indian Ocean Region is immature. In contrast to the dizzying array of often overlapping transatlantic and European institutions, only a few, relatively weak, international organizations are in place to foster economic, political, and security cooperation. Yet many of the world's most troubling hotspots and security flashpoints are in the Pacific Region.

Institutions and treaty organizations are not a panacea and will not solve intractable problems alone. However, they do provide the opportunity for structured, routine, enduring, communications and can serve as forums to generate consensus or mitigate disputes. A treaty organization for the Pacific is required as the foundation for peace, stability and progress in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The stakes are simply too high to ignore the problem. Starting with improved transparency and communications between the United States and China, the foremost leadership challenge for the United States in the Pacific is to effectively interact with the Chinese.

### Policies and Orientations

United States policy in the Pacific seems clear—this region is the United States' priority and the United States intends to approach and resource the region as such. The 'pivot to the Pacific'<sup>3</sup> reflects a significant reorientation of American foreign policy. Although the potential and significance of the Pacific have been forecast and

recognized for some time, the United States' primary focus remained on Europe, and then on Afghanistan, Iraq and a global war against terrorism. The Obama Administration seems to have a firm grasp of the realities of changes in the world environment and a clear direction. Part of that change is a shift in focus to the Pacific and the Obama Administration seems determined to orient multiple elements of national power toward this priority. Current policy seems directed at the isolation of China, not engagement. Failure to consider or dismissing the possibility of engagement with China risks missing a strategic opportunity.

The Obama Administration's policy toward China began as somewhat ambivalent and has descended into almost open confrontation. The *National Security Strategy* published in May 2010 is not openly adversarial towards China, nor does it offer strong potential for cooperation. The NSS opens with an imperative to 'begin at home' and build American strength domestically.<sup>4</sup> It acknowledges the significance an open international system to the United States economy.<sup>5</sup> The strategy stipulates that the United States will deepen cooperation, with "centers of influence—including China, India and Russia—on the basis of mutual interest and mutual respect."<sup>6</sup> The strategy characterizes alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand as the, "bedrock of security in Asia,"<sup>7</sup> and commits a paragraph deep into the document to China, stipulating the United States, "will continue to pursue a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship with China."<sup>8</sup> Overall, the strategy establishes ambivalence toward United States-China relations and takes a tone of watchful competition. Frequent references throughout to the importance of human rights

and responsible partnership will certainly not be lost on the Chinese leadership, who have expressed frustration at consistent United States preaching.

Since the publication of the *National Security Strategy*, the United States, led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, has taken a strikingly adversarial tone and positions relative to China. Most notable are a May 2011 interview in the Atlantic headlined with the Secretary of State's comments, "The Chinese system is doomed, leaders on a fool's errand,"<sup>9</sup> followed by an *Foreign Policy* article by the Secretary entitled: "America's Pacific Century."<sup>10</sup> These published comments follow a series of antagonistic statements, which have included lamenting Chinese internet restrictions,<sup>11</sup> warning African leaders to beware of "neocolonialism" regarding Chinese involvement on that continent,<sup>12</sup> and backing the Philippines over a dispute in the South China Sea.<sup>13</sup> In 2009, during a visit to China, the Secretary encouraged Chinese authorities to buy United States treasury bonds.<sup>14</sup> Surely the Chinese note the irony of United States admonishment over so many issues against calls for cooperation and even assistance.

This consistent offensive appears the result of a deliberate intent to isolate China. Viewed in the context of the United States' fiscal crisis and enduring economic downturn, this must seem supremely ironic, and nevertheless threatening, to the Chinese leadership. Yet the approach does not seem impetuous, but deeply considered and deliberate. In remarks entitled "America's Pacific Century," at the East-West Center in Honolulu days before the 2011 Asia-Pacific Summit, Secretary Clinton provided a comprehensive, thorough outline of both the situation in the Pacific and United States policy.<sup>15</sup> Consistent with the *National Security Strategy*, Secretary Clinton clearly outlined the significance of the region:

From the very beginning, the Obama Administration embraced the importance of the Asia Pacific region. So many global trends point to Asia. It's home to nearly half the world's population, it boasts several of the largest and fastest-growing economies and some of the world's busiest ports and shipping lanes, and it also presents consequential challenges such as military buildups, concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, natural disasters, and the world's worst levels of greenhouse gas emissions. It is becoming increasingly clear that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the world's strategic and economic center of gravity will be the Asia Pacific, from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas. And one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decades will be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in this region.<sup>16</sup>

In these remarks, she made specific reference to the institutions of Europe and the merits of the Atlantic Alliance, suggesting the promise of international institutions and going so far as to refer to Europe as a model.<sup>17</sup> The speech reiterated the administration's six lines of action in the Pacific: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening working relationships with emerging powers; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.<sup>18</sup>

The Secretary of State seemed determined in the speech to communicate partnerships and priorities, and China was found far down the list. She described United States alliances with treaty partners Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand as the fulcrum of United States efforts in the Asia Pacific.<sup>19</sup> She stated the United States' ability to build a successful regional architecture will turn on ability to work effectively with the emerging powers, "like Indonesia, or India, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Pacific Island countries."<sup>20</sup> So, primacy of place in these remarks did not fall to China—which many consider to be the most important emerging power in the world, not just the region.

When she did turn to China, the Secretary acknowledged, “On the economic front, the United States and China have to work together – there is no choice – to ensure strong, sustained, balanced future global growth.”<sup>21</sup> From there, she criticized Chinese trade practices, political system, and human rights record, while reiterating United States commitment to Taiwan.<sup>22</sup> Concluding, she emphasized American commitment to the Pacific region. Taken as a whole, the speech reflected a clear-minded assessment and an equally clear intention for the administration to metaphorically “shout down” China while suggesting a strategic partnership is required. The goals and aspirations of United States policy seem sound. The mechanisms toward achieving any kind of partnership seem dead on arrival.

Analysts provide widely varying interpretations of China’s increased power and the implications for international relations in general and United States’ foreign policy in particular. Much of the discussion follows the line of the usual suspects, with international relations realists arguing that aggressive Chinese pursuit of interests will lead other countries to balance against it, leading to a struggle analogous to the Cold War.<sup>23</sup> The other side of the debate has liberals positing that China can and will be welcomed into an international order that suits its interests.<sup>24</sup> Neither of these models is deterministic.

There is a significant divergence from the Soviet case and the Cold War. Rather than viewing the United States and capitalist economics as a global and existential threat, modern China benefits from participation in the global economy and seems clearly oriented to extend its economic ties. Three questions are essential in considering grand strategy: “What are the nation’s core interests? What external forces threaten

them? And what can the national leadership do to safeguard them?”<sup>25</sup> When evaluating another country’s intentions, it is wise to also consider whether and how it has answered these questions. The United States may be susceptible to mirror or double imaging concerning China. After a protracted Cold War and long experience evaluating the strategic intentions of the Soviet Union, the United States should consider the level of development and maturity of China’s foreign policy, as well as its content. Appreciating the sensitivity of Chinese leaders to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats may be a more useful starting point than straightforward interest calculation.

Although the Chinese government has no published strategy analogous to a national security strategy, it has articulated official positions relating to foreign policy. In July 2009, President Hu Jintao announced that China’s diplomacy must:

Safeguard the interests of sovereignty, security, and development. Dai Bingguo, the state councilor for external relations, defined those core interests in an article last December: first China’s political stability, namely the stability of the CCP leadership and the socialist system; second sovereign security, territorial integrity, and national unification; and third, China’s sustainable economic and social development.<sup>26</sup>

The priorities expressed in this announcement are strikingly similar to President Obama’s focus on the domestic economy. Given this focus, it is useful to note that other countries’ actions will affect both China’s internal development and external behavior. As Jisi Wang observed in *Foreign Affairs*: “If the international community appears not to understand China’s aspirations, its anxieties, and its difficulties in feeding itself and modernizing, the Chinese people may ask themselves why China should be bound by rules that were essentially established by the Western powers.”<sup>27</sup> Wang goes further to summarize the complexity of reading signals from the Chinese perspective:

It is virtually impossible to distinguish China’s friends from its foes. The United States might pose political and military threats, and Japan, a

staunch United States ally, could be a geopolitical competitor of China's, but these two countries also happen to be two of China's greatest economic partners. Even though political difficulties appear to be on the rise with the European Union, it remains China's top economic partner. Russia, which some Chinese see as a potential security ally, is far less important economically and socially to China than is South Korea, another United States military ally.<sup>28</sup>

Even if the point is conceded that Chinese strategic intentions are difficult to infer, the fact remains that the Chinese regime is not at all transparent about either capabilities or intentions. China's military buildup cannot be ignored. Former United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld posed the question somewhat dramatically when he asked: "Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?"<sup>29</sup> insinuating expansionist Chinese ambition. Since then, the Obama Administration's rhetoric on the military buildup has eased somewhat, but even the balanced view of the 2011 Department of Defense Report to Congress on China is rightly cautionary. The report highlights China's new international role and recognizes a, "comprehensive military modernization program."<sup>30</sup> The report states: "The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that reinforces international rules and norms and enhances security and peace both regionally and globally."<sup>31</sup> The report welcomes an expanded role for China's military, but also notes China's modernized military could be put to use in ways that increase China's ability to gain diplomatic advantage or resolve disputes in its favor."<sup>32</sup> This balanced view of a real increase of military power well characterizes ambiguity on both sides.

Charles Glaser argues that potential conflict with China will most likely emanate not from sweeping challenges across the international system, but from known areas of dispute. He argues that conflict is not pre-determined and can be managed.<sup>33</sup> This point



of view has much to offer. At the very least, given the significance of China for the United States and the significance of United States-Chinese relations for the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, a mature policy must consider more optimistic possibilities and a Cold War over the Pacific. Current United States policy does not seem to embrace broader possibilities.

In his 2011 book, *On China*, no less an authority on United States-Chinese relations and international politics than former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argues for a Pacific Community.<sup>34</sup> One of Dr. Kissinger's central assertions, summarized by Andrew Nathan in a *Foreign Affairs* Review Essay, is that the Chinese do not seek a conclusive outcome akin to the hegemony that many in western security organs may fear, but that the Chinese play a game of: "combative coexistence, seeking to improve their relative power position amid the ever changing forces of world politics."<sup>35</sup> Nathan also summarizes the divide described in *On China* between American diplomacy aimed at separating and 'solving' issues with attempts by the Chinese to achieve common understandings.<sup>36</sup>

United States policy is not well served by a narrowly conceived, deterministic approach aimed at "resolving" issues. Secretary of State Clinton has raised the comparison between the Pacific and the Atlantic—referring explicitly to the Atlantic Partnership as having contributed effectively to goals now sought in the Pacific. However, while American diplomatic and military moves target and isolate China, there seems to be no sincere effort either at partnership or at a comprehensive and enduring alliance. This narrow view risks missing a major opportunity. Though perhaps overly hopeful to the point of naiveté, the United States should at least seriously consider a

partnership across the Pacific that includes China as a strategic partner—analogous to the “special relationship” between the United States and Great Britain.<sup>37</sup> Practical execution is likely to lead to something less, but a vision for a cooperative future could be extremely powerful.

### International Institutions

International institutions are no panacea. Whether intended to foster economic cooperation, address security issues, form a military alliance or create a common polity, the record of international institutions in accomplishing their intended and specified aims is decidedly mixed. Tracing the path from the League of Nations through the United Nations, it is fair to say that high-minded rhetoric and aspirations for international institutions have merit, but actual, practical contributions lag. However, viewed as instruments and channels for international relations, institutions offer the potential for communication and structured decision-making. Such routine and open channels, as well as the confidence building that routine cooperation may accomplish, are sorely needed in the Pacific region and specifically between the United States and China.

The well-developed international relations literature provides a framework contributing to the understanding of the role of international institutions. Liberalism, realism, social constructivism outline categories of thought.<sup>38</sup> As distinct schools of thought reflecting significant differences regarding the nature of the international environment and state interaction, each of these theories recognizes the role of international organizations. All of them recognize international organizations as a forum for interstate communication. The cases of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provide interesting, and perhaps informative, contrast and comparison with treaty, alliance and international organization

relationships in the Pacific. The history and environment in the Pacific Region are radically different from the environment that informed the creation of the EU and NATO. So, too, the cultural and social relationships: the United States was tied to Europe through historical, social and cultural ties, as were the States or Europe tied to each other. Most significantly, however, the development of the EU and NATO over the past fifty-plus years outline the potential for international organizations,<sup>39</sup> pitfalls that may be expected along the way, and some caution about expectations management.

There are some commonalities between the North Atlantic Theater and the Pacific. Trade and economics have been core interests served by North Atlantic cooperation. For much of the post-World War II period, Europe was the largest trading partner of the United States and vice versa. It almost goes without mentioning that the United States traces its roots to Europe. Less often discussed are ties across the entire Western Hemisphere to countries across Europe. Common language, government institutions, cultural and familial ties bind three continents together. These ties, together with realpolitik considerations, led to United States participation in two world wars on the European continent. Together with Europe, the United States outlined the world system in place today.

The case of China and the Pacific offers a contrast, but looking to the future, perhaps more commonalities than might be immediately apparent. American cultural ties to the Pacific are more dynamic. Asian immigration to the United States is on the rise, and the degree of cultural interaction is significant considering the number of student and professional exchanges that occur every year. Official and historical cultural ties run much less deep. Viewed against developed relations with Europe dating to the

beginning of the American republic (and before), relations with the Pacific as a whole and with each country in particular pale in comparison.

The European Union presents an intriguing, perhaps mystifying example of an international organization. At first blush the EU example might seem particularly germane to the Pacific. The European Union, after all, was founded primarily on economic cooperation—the scale and depth of economic cooperation within and across the Pacific is the primary common interest—particularly between the United States and China (but also with Japan and India). As the inheritor of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community (Common Market), however, the EU always had an underlying political motivation that does not seem applicable in the Pacific. The realist foundation of tying European heavy industries together and a progressive sentiment are reflected in the Treaty of Rome. Even preceding the inception of the Common Market, its founders hoped for the “ever closer union” eventually codified in the EU Treaty of Amsterdam and now manifesting itself in a common currency and supranational government institutions.

The EU path of aiming at governmental integration with an eye toward political union does not seem applicable to the Pacific Rim. However, economic ties serve as a common interest in the Indian and Pacific Oceans—all the rising powers depend on international trade and the sea lanes that support it. Further, all depend on trade with the United States and the United States is intertwined with Pacific countries in a globalized economy and international division of labor. What is common between the European Union experience and a Pacific Century is the desire for stable markets and conditions of trade. The “free movement of goods, capital and labor” characteristic of

the EU and its precursors also characterizes Pacific trade. While the countries of the Pacific seem in no way bound for political union, rationalization and codification of the rules of the road seem to be a compelling common interest.

Successor to the Western European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's primary purpose was to address the rising threat of the Soviet Union. A secondary purpose was to allow Germany to contribute to defense on the continent while tying it into a formal alliance structure. Another core purpose of the treaty was to tie the United States to the defense of Europe. Given the nature of modern, mechanized warfare, Soviet military buildup and potential for nuclear war, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty<sup>40</sup> bound all partners to act together—but particularly tied the United States to Europe. Most notably, NATO was formed to confront a common enemy believed to present a clear and present danger. In this regard, NATO does not seem to well-inform development of a Pacific Alliance, as to some degree the major protagonists are approaching each other as common adversaries.

Less commonly understood is the role of NATO as a political alliance and forum for decision-making. Although NATO decision-making processes have often been painfully slow, particularly to Americans, the Alliance has proven capable of taking decisions and executing operations. Surely most frustrating was the run-up to operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina when the United States and the countries of Europe seemingly stared at each other across the Atlantic, waiting for the other to act while atrocities were being committed and United Nations troops found themselves in untenable positions. When the Alliance did finally act to enforce the Dayton Accords, many regarded it as too little, too late—but it was a beginning. Since, operations in

Kosovo, on the high seas, in Afghanistan and even in cyberspace demonstrate the potential for allied action in a complex world. Experience with NATO also highlights the limits of alliance action, and moderates expectations for rapid or forceful decision-making by consensus.

Neither the EU nor NATO serves as a direct example for potential alliance relationships in the Pacific region. However, both offer bounds of the possible and indicate pitfalls and limitations, as well as highlighting some of the potential of international organizations. Most informative are: first, the existence of these organizations; after settling grievances and resolving disputes through either a balance of power, diplomatic intrigue or destructive wars for hundreds of years, the countries of Europe have opted to form institutions to govern economic cooperation and security. Second, the limitations of international organizations formed amongst countries with seemingly strong commonality of interests (and society, history and culture). Perhaps third is the most applicable lesson: institutions can form a useful and enduring purpose, but the objectives achieved will often not seem commensurate with the effort required—the “good” for the many may often seem limited and excruciating to achieve to the few.

### The Pacific Environment

Particularly compared to the (perhaps over-) developed institutional framework in Europe, international institutions and organizations for economic cooperation and collective security in the Pacific are immature. Perhaps manageable in the past century, living with this immature framework represents unacceptable risk in the twenty-first century. Given the criticality of commerce and trade from this region to the global economy, and multiple unresolved security situations, either building upon or

revolutionizing the institutional framework with a collaborative and long-term view is vital to United States interests and a necessary step to more effective global governance.

The United Nations overall international legal regime is insufficient to serve American interests or protect security in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. The United Nations can serve as a legitimizing and reinforcing institution to regional agreements, perhaps even as a hedge or backstop that facilitates achieving regional agreements since powers may perceive an appellate or second-chance opportunity for decisions made at the regional level to be considered at the United Nations. As an organization, the United Nations will not lock-in trade and economic and security cooperation agreements that may serve as the foundation for regional cooperation in the Pacific.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum describes itself as the premier Asia-Pacific economic forum. Originally founded on the premise of trade liberalization, APEC's remit was seemingly expanded after the 1993 Seattle summit, where leaders agreed that APEC should also aim toward creating a sense of community among its members.<sup>41</sup> This group provides a foundation for discussion and exchange, but not the kind of codified and enduring guarantees achieved by the European Union. A high-visibility platform for announcements, it is short on deliverables. Expanded membership in the mid-1990s encumbers concerted action, deviation from a trade liberalization agenda and "soft intuitionism" (voluntary compliance) hinder the effectiveness of APEC<sup>42</sup> and present challenges to envisioning this forum as a foundation for effective Pacific institutions. The goals of APEC are aligned with United States goals and interests, but it is not powerful or effective enough to serve as the basis deeper goals.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)<sup>43</sup> provides a forum for discussion and common cause on economic and security issues, but does not represent a comprehensive or compulsory collective security arrangement. The Asian financial crisis illuminated the fragility of ASEAN as a regional institution and tempered wide-ranging aspirations for economic integration.<sup>44</sup> Despite the aspirations of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, significant questions regarding the relevance of ASEAN endure.<sup>45</sup> ASEAN remains relevant in international relations and security issues, particularly as a forum to moderate disputes among its members.<sup>46</sup> Its more ambitious goals for economic integration are challenged in the global economic environment.<sup>47</sup>

The case of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) offers a cautionary tale and a case for tempered expectations. A collective defense organization, established in 1955, SEATO was primarily created to block further communist gains in Southeast Asia.<sup>48</sup> SEATO is generally considered a failure because internal conflict and dispute hindered general use of the SEATO military; however, SEATO-funded cultural and educational programs left long-standing effects in Southeast Asia. SEATO was dissolved on June 30, 1977.

The Commonwealth of Nations is worthy of consideration in regional issues. With two members in the Pacific and ties to the United States and Great Britain, the Commonwealth provides a potential forum for talks and possible extension of security cooperation. Additionally, the United States has a number of enduring bilateral security arrangements, most notably with Japan and Korea, as well as a multi-lateral relationship with Australia, a war in Afghanistan and a tenuous relationship with Pakistan and an emerging relationship with India.



The Six-Party Talks aiming to find a peaceful resolution to the security concerns resulting from the North Korean nuclear weapons program are a precedent for dialog that bear promise. The fact that the talks included China, Japan, Russia and the United States, in addition to North and South Korea, is in and of itself significant. Despite the talks being disbanded, they were inclusive of global and regional powers and sought unified action on an issue of common interest. Although the group failed to resolve the core issue of halting the North Korean nuclear program, a precedent for collaboration was set.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, made headlines in 2005 when it called for Washington to set a timeline for withdrawing from military bases in Central Asia. The organization's activities have expanded to include increased military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism drills. While some experts say the organization has emerged as a powerful anti-United States bulwark in Central Asia, others believe frictions between its two largest members, Russia and China, effectively preclude a strong, unified Shanghai Cooperation Organization.<sup>49</sup> Despite the limitations and internal conflict inherent in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it is worth noting that the Russians have sought and achieved institutional common ground with China and the Central Asian powers. This initiative is indicative of the institutional vacuum in the region.

Taken together, institutional arrangements and enduring forums for problem solving in the Pacific are weak. The vacuum of institutions provides space for competition between China and the United States. The current tendency of attempting

to balance power appears headed toward a bipolar confrontation that may be unnecessary, likely will be counter-productive, and will limit cooperation in crises. This situation stands a good chance of exacerbating current security challenges where there may be the possibility of joint effort to address and mitigate key issues.

### Policy and Options

Like it or not (and probably both) the United States will be a leader in Pacific security relationships. The current stated policy of maintaining and reinforcing existing, long-standing bilateral security alliances has merit, but is unimaginative and seems to reflect the past more than it envisions the future. The tenor and content of United States communications to China point to an adversarial future—an approach likely to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Rather than moving into the future with its eye on the past, the United States should consider a bright future informed by the past. Diplomatic failures and centuries of war in Europe gave way to a robust institutional framework in the aftermath of World War II. Notwithstanding the decidedly mixed results of NATO and the on-again, off-again progression of the EU from a collaborative organization to an ‘ever-closer union’ or supranational government, the institutions of Europe have provided a forum for collective decision-making. No such forum exists for the Pacific and Asia—both the divide and the need are great between the United States and China. Regardless its overall policy, improvement in United States-Chinese relations and communications are desirable.

Geopolitical realities frame options for institutions, alliances, or partnerships in the Pacific. Given the location, economic power, influence and historical role of China, it is difficult to conceive of a Pacific framework serving U.S. interests that does not include or address China. However, China cannot be considered in isolation. India’s geo-

strategic position, relationship to China, economic growth, and shared language and democracy make India an essential partner in nearly any meaningful arrangement. India's nuclear weapons and relations with Pakistan also make it critical to crisis management in the region.

Any U.S.-Chinese joint efforts are likely to arouse concerns from China's neighbors, who in many cases are also American security partners. The United States has played a key role in guaranteeing Japanese security since World War II. Any rapprochement with China is sure to raise concerns in Japan. Similarly, Korea has benefitted from U.S. security guarantees and serves as a base for American forward deployment. In its "pivot" to the Pacific, the United States has emphasized existing alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to reassure long-standing allies of continued U.S. commitment. However, achieving a breakthrough in the Pacific requirement may require thinking beyond existing alliances. U.S. Policy to date recognizes a desire for improved partnership with China and India, but serious consideration of useful new alliances or institutional structures is not part of the discussion. The six pillars of U.S. policy<sup>50</sup> do not include revolutionizing security structures or envisioning an overarching institutional structure.

China's rise has been built on export-driven economic growth. United States power is based on its economy. Global economic integration is a key characteristic of the twenty-first century. Any future that stifles trade will be bad for both the United States and China—impacting the core interests of both countries. Related to trade, instability of international money markets has proven destabilizing and global. All developed areas of the world have experienced fiscal crises in the past fifteen years.

Each of these crises has highlighted the susceptibility of the global economy to currency issues and has highlighted the transferability of economic effects across the world.

Trade and financial markets represent core interests for the United States and China and represent a promising basis for a breakthrough agreement and cooperative efforts at founding twenty-first century institutions. In addition to cooperation on trade, managing Pacific crises should be an area of cooperation for the United States and China. Instability is bad for business, and the Pacific Rim–Indian Ocean crisis areas represent the potential for significant instability.

There are serious areas of conflict that mitigate cooperation and institution-building between the United States and China. First and foremost is the rise of China as a regional power. China has been, and is likely to continue to be, resistant to U.S. efforts to tell it how to run affairs in its own region. Then there are specific concerns regarding Chinese (and American) trade practices, foreign currency holdings and oft-cited American assertions regarding the Chinese human rights record. This is an important list. From a realpolitik perspective, it does not serve the United States well to let human rights concerns obscure the opportunity to engage a rising power. From a constructivist perspective, the United States will continue to lose leverage if its statements calling for strategic partnership are consistently accompanied by a litany of complaints about Chinese behavior, and U.S. military and diplomatic strategies seemingly aimed at containing and deterring China rather than rigorous efforts to influence China as a partner on the level of European powers or other regional allies.

United States policy should consider a full range of options. A breakthrough alliance with China should be seriously considered. Any alliance with China should

include India as an equal leading partner. The most visionary option would include these key strategic partners in an overarching security arrangement providing collective defense and conflict resolution mechanisms. Given complex geopolitical circumstances and challenging history, achieving a breakthrough alliance may not be possible—but the option should be developed and considered. If NATO and the EU are the successors to two civil wars and centuries of conflict in Europe and were motivated in large part by the existential threat from the Soviets, American policy should be farsighted enough to consider steering past damaging conflict to a cooperative future.

In fairness to the United States administration, trade cooperation was a central tenet of its China policy initially. Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of the Treasury Geithner introduced “A New Strategic and Economic Dialogue” with China, in 2009 and pursued a series of high-level exchanges.<sup>51</sup> Consistent with current dialog, the initiative recognized the criticality of the relationship, with the Secretaries asserting:

Few global problems can be solved by the U.S. or China alone. And few can be solved without the U.S. and China together. The strength of the global economy, the health of the global environment, the stability of fragile states and the solution to nonproliferation challenges turn in large measure on cooperation between the U.S. and China.<sup>52</sup>

However, even in introducing the dialog, the American tone was that of telling China what to do, insisting on Chinese financial sector reform and development, domestic demand growth and reduced reliance on exports.<sup>53</sup> Given this beginning, subsequent frustration and disappointment with bilateral talks should not be surprising. A summary of high level talks in 2010 captures the dialog, which ends up sounding more like a standoff:

The United States came with a long wish list for China on both economic and security issues, while China mostly wants to be left alone to pursue policies that are turning it into an economic superpower.<sup>54</sup>

Secretary Clinton reiterated the Strategic and Economic Dialog in her November 2011 remarks at the East-West Center, and mentioned an accompanying Strategic Security Dialog. However, taken as a whole, and even in the context of positive comments, these efforts but seem clearly a lesser part of a broader strategy aimed at isolating China.<sup>55</sup>

An overarching, revolutionary, agreement would likely require a high-level, substantive approach to the Chinese accompanied by intense closed-door negotiations to develop a framework for cooperation. The initial aim point with the best potential is a regime for balancing international monetary flows and managing monetary crises. Large Chinese holdings of American debt and trade reliance should make this an area where the United States can work with China as an equal, or greater than equal, partner on the world stage in order to establish sincerity of American intent and seriousness of purpose. If agreement on some key principles can be reached, the European Union, and key allies, particularly G20 partners, would have to be included. Timing and strategy would be essential, as it might be most beneficial to an emerging Pacific Alliance to announce U.S.-Chinese initiative as a first step and then work with others for a broader program.

In order to think big, a strategic breakthrough agreement should also address security issues. In this area, cooperation begun during the Six Party Talks is a starting point. What is lacking in the Six Party Talks is an enduring institutional framework, a broader scope and inclusion of key partners to address the most important regional issues. The Six Party Talks provide a forum including Russia. The key regional player missing is India. A serious Pacific forum addressing collective security would need to address issues of the global commons and the South China Sea, Taiwan, India-

Pakistan and North Korea. Of course, because these issues are so contentious and widely ranging, no existing forum has been able to approach them in a serious way. Taking a big bite at the apple, including India as a secondary partner in economic-fiscal discussions and as a key partner in security issues could provide a leap forward. A key question would be whether and when to include all regional actors and United States Allies.

If a breakthrough overarching agreement is unattainable or does not maximize long-term United States interests, other options are possible between a NATO for Asia and simply reinforcing existing alliances and forums. APEC exists as an economic forum and bilateral economic ties between the United States and China are significant. Security ties are virtually non-existent. Some movement on security cooperation should be a minimum goal for the United States. The *National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy*, and other official and academic documents assert that the United States wants China as a partner. It is difficult to find suggestions or a blueprint regarding how such a partnership could actually come about. The track record of the Six Party Talks demonstrates the significant challenges of attempting both to include relevant players and to produce results. Options for a military alliance could range from a NATO-like collective security organization to simple confidence building measures.

Improved transparency in military capabilities could serve as a first principle. Lack of transparency is a central shortcoming in current United States-China relations, but also complicates multiple regional issues, from North Korea to India-Pakistan. Lack of certainty regarding cyber capabilities and intentions raises suspicions on all sides. Security consultation and cooperation is a reasonable second objective. Both at the

strategic level and on a mil-to-mil basis, cooperation and exchanges have much to offer. As has been seen recently in the movement referred to as the Arab Spring, military professionalization can support political liberalization and can contribute to moderating conflict.

A broad, effective Pacific Alliance is unlikely in the near term. However, a broad concept could provide a vision for an alliance that might grow in depth and cooperation over time. A “NATO for the Pacific” is not beyond the realm of imagination, but at present requires an active imagination. The situation in the twenty-first century Pacific is not nearly as bi-polar as was the situation in Europe when NATO and its predecessor organizations were formed. However, there may be some motivations to build from. States in Asia, starting with U.S. alliance partners, have valid concerns about a rising China. China has concerns about sustaining its development, managing internal issues and improving its regional position. The United States has concerns on both sides of the equation and little means to address issues directly. Proposing a Pacific Treaty Organization with broadly inclusive membership—based on existing United States alliance partners and including China and India—could bridge this gap.

A mature Pacific Alliance would manage regional issues relating to the global commons—sea, air, and cyber. A mature, developed alliance could also serve as the foundation for managing collective defense. In order to be credible, a nascent alliance would have to serve as a forum for collaboration on key security issues and crisis areas as well as providing a means to significantly improve transparency between the military forces involved in the region. Similar to the evolution of NATO, achieving consensus, developing capability, and actually conducting military operations might move at a slow



and frustrating pace for some partners, but simply developing a comprehensive forum and providing an institutional basis from which true partnerships could grow would be a starting point. At the very least, a proposal including China (and India) as core partners in regional security could improve the current dialog and it would be more consistent with published U.S. aims. After initiating a dialog on an institutional structure, the variations that might be achievable and useful are seemingly limitless. From a treaty-based collective security alliance including multiple partners, to a core alliance with many Partnership for Peace-like affiliates and aspirants to a recurring set of meetings or improved professional exchanges; innumerable options are possible.

The tactics of addressing and achieving a security alliance are complicated in and of themselves. Given the acrimonious dialog between the American and Chinese governments, perhaps a regional country such as Australia or Japan would be better received in suggesting an alliance—or even initiating a conference or meetings to consider an alliance structure. The United Nations might provide another avenue. Given the U.N. role in conferring legitimacy, a regional alliance starting in the U.N. would be a novel approach to improved multilateral relations. A proposal by the United States, worked privately with the Chinese, would be the most powerful way to demonstrate the seriousness of United States intentions, but would risk public failure of an initial effort and potentially alienating other countries.

If, either in theory and deliberation, or in practice, a multilateral alliance is judged too difficult, impractical, or likely to be toothless, the United States should seriously consider adding an alliance with China to its lists of bilateral alliances forming the foundation of Pacific security. Rather than continuing to isolate China, reinforcing

differences and encouraging a defensive mentality, the United States should consider revolutionary engagement. Values differences and oft-repeated American complaints over Chinese human rights abuses are a central obstacle to an alliance. However, there is a strong argument to suggest the United States will have more influence on all fronts as a result of engagement than it has chiding a rising power from the outside and in the press. An alliance with China would also cause concern from current allies and threaten Russia. These are significant—potentially prohibitive—concerns, but they are conditions of the geo-strategic landscape in any Pacific century. The United States should not be constrained by the past or others' concerns.

If China cannot be brought into a broad alliance initially, perhaps a gradualist model on the lines of the growth and expansion of the European Union, either in terms of member participation and policy remit/portfolio could be accomplished. The United States has a solid foundation with Australia and Japan and could likely add India into a Pacific alliance based on trade cooperation and growing into better and more formal disaster response and security cooperation. In addition to leveraging and reinforcing existing bilateral alliances, such an option could attempt to strengthen and grow current cooperative forums such as APEC and ASEAN. Current alliance partners could consider an approach to China along the lines of the Partnership for Peace pursued with former eastern bloc countries. Multiple avenues of military engagement and cooperation are available: from attendance at service schools, to conferences and joint exercises.

One advantage of this approach is that it can be played both ways. If, as is stated in the current policy, the United States intends to build around existing alliances and

partners, more structured cooperation will reinforce the pivot to the Pacific. Cooperation with existing partners can either isolate or include China. At the same time, extending or deepening security cooperation with new partners, as outlined in the current strategy, can contribute to isolating China or move toward inclusion and cooperation. The significant disadvantage of this approach is that it would not provide a strategic decision-making forum inclusive of China and stands a good chance of exacerbating communication issues and mutual suspicion. This is a significant concern.

Grounded in a clear-minded assessment of our interests, potential competitors and with a long view of the twenty-first century international security environment, the United States should seek to build a framework for cooperation across the Pacific. Informed first by the twentieth century experiences of two world wars and the Cold War; and secondly by the successes and challenges of both collective security in NATO and economic integration in the European Union, we should consider the option of building an *a priori* (preceding confrontation) approach to building security institutions in the Pacific. After living through a relationship with the Soviet Union which came to be framed as a threatening rivalry with an international competitor and nuclear power, we should consider the possibility of building a constructive framework with China. It is in our national security interests to consider the complete range of options for international cooperation, to include an enduring, deep partnership and alliance with China.

### Conclusion

The world is still struggling to define the post-Cold War period, and the world is continuing to move. Concepts and thinkers formed in the aftermath of World War II have much merit, but they are insufficient to a world of seven billion people and growing that has witnessed the victory of capitalism, followed by renewed challenges. They are

insufficient to a world of rising powers and one remaining superpower. If we continue to view the world through antiquated lenses, we are likely to create a world like the one we have distastefully experienced: a global superpower confrontation. Nowhere is new thinking needed more than in United States-Chinese relations—and yet creative thinking for this region seems to be seriously lacking. Former Secretary of State Kissinger pleads for an expansive vision in his recent book:

When Premier Zhou Enlai and I agreed on the communiqué that announced the secret visit, he said: “This will shake the world.” What a culmination, if, forty years later, the United States and China could merge their efforts not to shake the world, but to build it.<sup>56</sup>

China is a rising power—but its continued rise is not inexorable. No one recognizes this more than China’s own leaders, who are struggling to balance historically unprecedented development and all the dislocations and changes this has incurred with the impacts of social change. China’s foreign policy should be viewed through a window overlooking its current and foreseen domestic challenges. Rising nationalism and great power ambitions should be balanced against the real struggles of feeding its population and satisfying social demands. Viewed in context, it may be easier for the United States to consider engaging with China as a partner, rather than barking at the country like an angry dog and expecting results. No doubt there are real concerns over growing military capability, economic and fiscal power, human rights abuses and other issues. In every case, United States interests—and global interests—will be better served by improved transparency and communications. International institutions can facilitate transparency and consultation. United States policy should seriously consider institution-building in the Pacific, starting with China.

The United States has clearly signaled its intention to make the Pacific a priority. There are many players on the Pacific scene, important partners and global actors, but none compare to China in terms of power and potential across all elements of hard and soft national power. Turning the history of the twentieth century on its head, the great powers of the current century should build effective international institutions to mitigate conflict and address instability before, not after, the next world war.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Woodrow Wilson, *The Leaders of Men*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952 (orig. 17 June 1890)), 75.

<sup>2</sup> Comments made during a series of appearances by United States President Barack Obama during a November 2011 visit to Australia, just before the APEC Forum and Asia-Pacific summit. Citations:

Barack Obama and Julia Gillard, "Press Conference, Parliament House, Canberra, Australia," (Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 16, 2011), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/16/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-gillard-australia-joint-press>, (accessed January 24, 2012).

Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament," Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, (Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 17, 2011), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>, (accessed January 24, 2012).

Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama to United States and Australian Service Members," Royal Army Air Force Base, Darwin, Australia, (Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 17, 2011), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-us-and-australian-service-members>, (accessed January 24, 2012).

Commentary/reaction:

Jackie Calmes, "A United States Marine Base for Australia Irritates China," *New York Times*, November 16, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed Jan. 24, 2012).

<sup>3</sup> Hillary Rodham Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas\\_pacific\\_century](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century)[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas\\_pacific\\_century](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century) (accessed January 24, 2012).

<sup>4</sup> Barrack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 1, 2, 7, 9-10.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 42.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 43. The paragraph bears inclusion in its entirety:

We will continue to pursue a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship with China. We welcome a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the United States and the international community to advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation. We will monitor China's military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that United States interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected. More broadly, we will encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity as its influence rises. We are using our newly established Strategic and Economic Dialogue to address a broader range of issues, and improve communication between our militaries in order to reduce mistrust. We will encourage continued reduction in tension between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. We will not agree on every issue, and we will be candid on our human rights concerns and areas where we differ. But disagreements should not prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interest, because a pragmatic and effective relationship between the United States and China is essential to address the major challenges of the 21st century.

<sup>9</sup> Jeffrey Goldberg, "Hillary Clinton: Chinese System Is Doomed, Leaders on a 'Fool's Errand'" *The Atlantic*, May 10 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/hillary-clinton-chinese-system-is-doomed-leaders-on-a-fools-errand/238591/> (accessed January 24, 2012).

<sup>10</sup> Clinton, "America's Pacific Century."

<sup>11</sup> Peter Foster, "China: Hillary Clinton's attack on web freedom 'harmful' to relations with US," *The Telegraph* (London), January 22, 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7051179/China-Hillary-Clintons-attack-on-web-freedom-harmful-to-relations-with-US.html> (accessed January 24, 2012).

<sup>12</sup> Reuters, "China dismisses US swipe on "colonial" role in Africa," June 14, 2011.

<sup>13</sup> Simone Orendain, Associated Press (Voice of America), "US Secretary of State Backs Philippines in South China Sea Dispute," Manila November 16, 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/US-Secretary-of-State-Backs-Philippines-in-South-China-Sea-Dispute-133951318.html> (accessed January 24, 2012).

<sup>14</sup> "Keep buying US Treasury bills, Clinton urges China," Taipei Times, February 23, 2009.

<sup>15</sup> Hillary Rodham Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Remarks at the East-West Center, Honolulu, HI, November 10, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/176999.htm> (accessed January 24, 2012).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Charles Glaser, "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," *Foreign Affairs*, 90.2, Mar/Apr 2011, 80.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Jisi Wang, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way," *Foreign Affairs* 90.2 (Mar/Apr 2011), 68.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>29</sup> Associated Press, "Rumsfeld: China Buildup a Threat to Asia," June 4, 2005, [http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8091198/ns/world\\_news-asia\\_pacific/t/rumsfeld-china-buildup-threat-asia/](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8091198/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/rumsfeld-china-buildup-threat-asia/) (accessed March 19, 2012).

<sup>30</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," 2011, 1.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Glaser, "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," 81.

<sup>34</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China*, Penguin Press, May 17, 2011, 528.

<sup>35</sup> Andrew J. Nathan, "What China Wants: Bargaining with Beijing," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2011, 153-154.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 154.

<sup>37</sup> An extensive quote from Dr. Kissinger at the conclusion of *On China* bears inclusion:

In pursuit of understanding the nature of peace, I have studied the construction and operation of international orders ever since I was a graduate student well over half a century ago. On the basis of these studies, I am aware that the cultural, historic, and strategic gaps in perception that I have described will pose formidable challenges for even the best-intentioned and most far-sighted leadership on both sides. On the other hand, were history confined to the mechanical repetition of the past, no transformation would ever have occurred. Every great achievement was a vision before it was a reality. In that sense, it arose from commitment, not resignation to the inevitable. (530)

<sup>38</sup> Margaret P. Karns and Karen Mingst, *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2010), 35.

<sup>39</sup> From *On China*, 514-515:

Can strategic trust replace a system of strategic threats? Strategic trust is treated by many as a contradiction in terms. Strategists rely on the intentions of the presumed adversary only to a limited extent. For intentions are subject to change. And the essence of sovereignty is right to make decisions not subject to another authority. A certain amount of threat based on capabilities is therefore inseparable from the relations of sovereign states.

In relations between the states bordering the North Atlantic, strategic confrontations are not conceivable. The military establishments are not directed against each other. Strategic threats are perceived as arising outside the Atlantic region, to be dealt with in an alliance framework. Disputes between the North Atlantic states tend to focus on divergent assessments of international issues and the means of dealing with them; even at their most bitter, they retain the character of an interfamily dispute. Soft power and multilateral diplomacy are the dominant tools of foreign policy, and for some Western European states, military action is all but excluded as a legitimate instrument of state policy.

In Asia, by contrast, the states consider themselves in potential confrontation with neighbors. It is not that they necessarily plan on war; they simply do not exclude it.

<sup>40</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty, art. 5, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm), (accessed January 25, 2012).

<sup>41</sup> "Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Leaders' Declaration," Blake Island, Seattle, November 20, 1993, [http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/1993/~media/Files/LeadersDeclarations/1993/1993\\_LeadersDeclaration.ashx](http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/1993/~media/Files/LeadersDeclarations/1993/1993_LeadersDeclaration.ashx) (accessed February 1, 2012).

<sup>42</sup> Richard W.X.Hu, "APEC and Future Asia-Pacific Regional Architecture," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 31, 2009, 16-17.

<sup>43</sup> The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) by the Founding Fathers of ASEAN: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.



Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999, giving ten ASEAN Member States today. As set out in the ASEAN Declaration, the aims and purposes of ASEAN are:

1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations;
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres;
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;
6. To promote Southeast Asian studies; and
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.

[http://www.aseansec.org/about\\_ASEAN.html](http://www.aseansec.org/about_ASEAN.html) (accessed February 28, 2012).

<sup>44</sup> Mya Than, ed., *ASEAN Beyond the Regional Crisis: Challenges and Initiatives*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 9.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 283-288.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *On China*, 150.

<sup>49</sup> Andrew Scheineson, "Backgrounder: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization," Council on Foreign Relations, updated March 24, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/shanghai-cooperation-organization/p10883> (accessed January 30, 2012).

<sup>50</sup> The six lines of action in the Pacific articulated by Secretary of State Clinton at the APEC form include: "Strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening working relationships with emerging powers; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and

investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights. “Hillary Rodham Clinton, “America's Pacific Century.” Clinton, “America's Pacific Century,” Remarks at the East-West Center.

<sup>51</sup> Hillary Rodham Clinton and Timothy Geithner, “A New Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China: Few global problems can be solved by either country alone,” *The Wall Street Journal (Opinion)*, July 27, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204886304574308753825396372.html>, (accessed March 15, 2012).

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Mark Landler, “Clinton and Geithner Face Hurdles in China Talk,” *The New York Times*, May 24, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/world/asia/25diplo.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed March 15, 2012).

<sup>55</sup> Clinton, “America's Pacific Century,” Remarks at the East-West Center. Direct citation from these remarks conveys the expressed American desire for cooperation, followed immediately by a list of demands for Chinese change—indicative of a standoff rather than a dialog:

Expanding our areas of common interest is essential. Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner and I, along with our Chinese counterparts, launched the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2009. These are the most intensive and expansive talks ever conducted between our governments, and we look forward to traveling to Beijing this spring for the fourth round. Now, we are looking to China to intensify dialogue between civilian and military officials through the Strategic Security Dialogue so we can have an open and frank discussions on the most sensitive issues in our relationship, including maritime security and cyber security.

On the economic front, the United States and China have to work together – there is no choice – to ensure strong, sustained, balanced future global growth. U.S. firms want fair opportunities to export to China's markets and a level playing field for competition. Chinese firms want to buy more high-tech products from us, make more investments in our country, and be accorded the same terms of access that market economies enjoy. We can work together on these objectives, but China needs to take steps to reform. In particular, we are working with China to end unfair discrimination against U.S. and other foreign companies, and we are working to protect innovative technologies, remove competition-distorting preferences. China must allow its currency to appreciate more rapidly and end the measures that disadvantage or pirate foreign intellectual property.

We believe making these changes would provide a stronger foundation for stability and growth, both for China and for everyone else. And we make a similar case when it comes to political reform. Respect for international law and a more open political system would also strengthen China's foundation, while at the same time increasing the confidence of China's partners.

We have made very clear our serious concerns about China's record on human rights. When we see reports of lawyers, artists, and others who are detained or disappeared, the United States speaks up both publicly and privately. We are alarmed by recent incidents in Tibet of young people lighting themselves on fire in desperate acts of protest, as well as the continued house arrest of the Chinese lawyer Chen Guangcheng. We continue to call on China to embrace a different path.

And we remain committed to the One-China policy and the preservation of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We have a strong relationship with Taiwan, an important security and economic partner, and we applaud the progress that we have seen in cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan during the past three years and we look forward to continued improvement so there can be peaceful resolution of their differences.

<sup>56</sup> *On China*, 530.

